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ABSTRACT
Context Primary care is a highly complex environ-
ment in which multiple safety problems have been
identified. Each primary care practice can be viewed
as a complex adaptive system with its own unique
characteristics. The introduction of an electronic
medical record (EMR) into such a system represents
a significant perturbation that can have multiple
unpredictable effects. From a safety standpoint this
can mean reduction in some vulnerabilities and in-
crease in others, as well as the introduction of new
vulnerabilities that did not exist under the old system.
Objective To estimate the impacts of a new EMR
on various aspects of practice function using a Fail-
ure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) approach
based on the concept of hazard adapted from safety
engineering.
Setting/participants Academic rural primary care
practice with 32 staff.
Design At baseline, a survey instrument (Perceived
Hazard Questionnaire) was used to elicit staff
(physicians, nurses and administrative) perceptions
of frequency and severity of multiple different
primary care errors in 12 different domains in the
practice. For each error, a Hazard score was
calculated based on the product of frequency and
severity. The Hazard scores thus derived were used
to prioritise the safety problems within the practice.
One year later, after partial implementation of an
EMR, the survey was repeated.
Main outcome measures Comparison is made
between priorities identified by physicians, nursing
and administrative staff before and after EMR
implementation.
Results At baseline, a high concordance between
priorities identified by physicians, nursing and
administrative staff was recorded. This concordance
halved after partial implementation of the EMR.
The staff perceived decreased hazard in nurse–
physician and physician–chart interactions but
hazard increased in the already high-hazard domains
of physician–patient interaction in the assessment
stage and nurse–chart interactions, apart from three
other domains.
Conclusions This FMEA-like approach identified
changes in practice hazards apparently related to
EMR implementation. This in turn can help in
targeting pre-existing and new vulnerabilities in
primary care practices.
Keywords: complex adaptive system, culture of
safety, EMR, error, FMEA, hazard, practice-based
FMEA, primary care, safety, team
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Introduction
A large and comprehensive 2004 profile of the quality
of health care in various communities across the
United States (US) reveals once again a huge chasm
between the existing capabilities of and the actual
quality of care delivered to patients and citizens by the
healthcare industry.1 This gap appears to be con-
sistently wide across the whole nation.
There are formidable and compelling pressures
from the US Federal Government, professional bodies
and accreditation authorities to make very rapid and
significant improvements in the quality of care in
both outpatient and inpatient settings. Whilst most
work to date has focused on inpatient settings, some
estimates suggest that outpatient settings are at least
as important with up to 200 000 avoidable deaths per
year.2,3 Primary care physicians, who provide the vast
majority of medical care, are struggling to provide the
quality of care that they are trained (over a long period)
to provide. They are working harder under the
pressures of increasing overheads, competing demands
and decreasing rewards in an unpredictable environ-
ment (especially related to health insurance and
malpractice) that causes instabilities in their efforts to
improve and maintain quality.4
Quality is defined by the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) as having three overlapping domains: safety of
patients and practitioners, practice consistent with
current domain knowledge and patient-centred care
(customisation).5 Various strategies that can be
adopted to improve patient safety in health care can
usefully be categorised as:
1 punitive action directed against individuals
2 counselling and retraining staff and patients
3 process redesign
4 technical and technological system enhancements
5 cultural changes aimed at safety.6
These strategies have been arranged above in the
ascending order of their effectiveness and sustain-
ability. As can be seen, the second most effective
strategy is that of technical and technological system
enhancements. This includes the use of computers
and information technology such as electronic medi-
cal records (EMR).
Introduction of relational databases in the form of
EMR has received considerable attention and support
because of their current and potential effectiveness in
(a) improving health care quality, including safety,
customisation and practice consistent with current
knowledge, particularly in relation to the imple-
mentation of decision support, (b) reducing practice
expenses, and (c) increasing revenues by improving
office efficiency and accuracy of billing as well as
customer satisfaction. This strategy also has potential
to contribute to the formation of a culture of safety.
In a recent analysis of data collected by the
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP),
Valdes et al found that only 1297 (23.5%) of the 5517
respondents, from a total mailing list of 35 554,
reported using an EMR. As many as 264 different
EMR software programs are currently used with only
0.4% using the same EMR software. This reflects the
fact that the primary healthcare industry in the US is
in the very early phases of adoption of this strategy.
Primary care is a highly complex environment in
which multiple safety problems have been identified.
Each primary care practice should be viewed as a
complex adaptive system (CAS) with its own unique
characteristics.8–15 The introduction of an EMR into
such a system represents a significant perturbation
that can have multiple unpredictable effects. From a
safety standpoint this can mean reduction in some
vulnerabilities and increase in others, as well as the
introduction of new vulnerabilities that did not exist
under the old system. The transition period, from
start to full implementation of an EMR, that is, partial
implementation, can present a particular challenge to
safety.
For a complex practice system to make the tran-
sition successfully it must be adaptive. The authors
propose the following three steps to achieving
adaptation:
1 Generation of information about the vulnerabilities
in the system (or sub-system). This places attention
on system failures instead of individual failures.
Dissemination of this information internally to all
team members is essential to aid learning about the
vulnerabilities. The US National Patient Safety
Foundation has identified this as the hallmark of a
safety culture.16
2 Pooling of diverse resources (including all members
of the healthcare team, patients and families, as well
as financial, organisational and material resources)
to generate options to respond to these vulner-
abilities and to cope with unpredictable external
and internal pressures.
3 Creation of good teams with qualities of mutual
trust, respect, collaboration and co-operation, and
with a shared vision of quality and mission of patient
care to perform steps 1 and 2 well and keep the pre-
vailing anxieties in check.12–15 These qualities and
vision become ‘central attractors’ in a complex
adaptive system. These attractors are the forces that
produce, over a period of time, order (pattern) in
disorder (chaos/unpredictability).
The most commonly used method for estimating
vulnerabilities in health care is to collect and count
errors through voluntary reporting systems (often
referred to as ‘incident reports’).17 These are fraught
with difficulty due to under-reporting (according to
R Singh, T Servoss, M Kalsman et al236
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the IOM report, only 5% of known errors are typically
reported), and then there are unknown errors and
abuse (such as reports filed and counter-filed as a
means of retaliation against colleagues).5 Bates et al
describe difficulties involved in defining and quan-
tifying errors. They report that even direct obser-
vational studies, which are highly labour-intensive,
often miss errors.
Furthermore, error reporting generally does not
promote steps 2 and 3 above. Instead it tends to be
associated with blame and shame and frequently
results in antagonism between team members, under-
mining mutual respect, trust and co-operation.
An alternative approach that is prospective, rather
than retrospective, and permits involvement of all
team members to identify and prioritise safety and
quality problems, is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA). This has been widely used in other high-risk
industries and has been advocated by the IOM as a
means of analysing a system to identify its weaknesses
(‘Failure Modes’), possible consequences of failure
(‘Effects’) and to prioritise areas for improvement.5
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) has required since 2002 that
all accredited hospitals perform proactive risk
assessment each year following a series of steps that
are based on FMEA.19,20
The authors have adapted the FMEA approach to
provide a rapid measurement tool for assessing the
effects of safety-motivated interventions.10,21 It is a
Practice-based Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(P-FMEA) type of proactive methodology that can 
be tailored for individual practices and is highly
adaptable. It is based on Hazard concepts adapted
from safety science and engineering. It aids formation
of self-empowered practice teams with a common
‘good enough’ vision to help the unique complex
systems adapt and thrive, taking advantage of site-
specific ‘central attractors’ of trust, mutual respect and
collaboration. This methodology succeeds in gener-
ating considerable enthusiasm and support from all
the workers in the practice. It is thought to be sup-
erior to alternative methods of measurement and can
also be used to supplement and complement them.
The P-FMEA approach is based on a Perceived
Hazard Questionnaire (PHQ). This questionnaire is
based and structured on a visual model of the entities
and their interactions.22 The survey focuses on 12 of
the key entities and interactions shown in Figure 1
and dedicates a page to each. Each page has a list of
failure modes that can occur in that specific part 
of the practice. The lists were developed by review of
the literature and consultation with practice leaders
and can be customised to incorporate special circum-
stances for any given practice if desired. The survey
contains a total of over 130 failure modes; respon-
dents are invited and encouraged to supplement this
list and comment upon it. Instead of asking each staff
member about their own personal error experiences,
it asks each staff member about their perception of the
whole practice.10,21 This approach takes advantage of
practice-based experiential knowledge and, like the
highly acclaimed Aviation Safety Reporting System,
has three important attributes of (a) safety (immunity
to blame and punishment), (b) simplicity and conven-
ience, and (c) worthiness and value (provides feedback
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Figure 1 Visual model of the practice micro-system
Patient
Patient
Third party Third partyAssessment plan
Provider
Chart
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and is a tool for development of improvement
strategies and enhancement of staff self-esteem).
Objective
The main objective of this study was to estimate the
impact of an EMR on various aspects of practice
function using the P-FMEA type approach, concen-
trating first on the transitory period leading to full
implementation. It is in the nature of implemen-
tations such as this that they cannot be instantly
implemented in practice. Assessment of their in-
fluence at various stages of implementation is
necessary to understand as fully as possible the impli-
cations of these perturbations in the practice.
Methods
At baseline, the instrument was used to elicit, anony-
mously and confidentially, physicians’, nurses’ and
administrative staff perceptions of frequency and
severity of multiple different primary care errors in
the 12 different domains in the practice. For each
error, a Hazard score was calculated based on the
product of frequency and severity. Table 1 shows the
Hazard rating matrix used.
One year later, after partial implementation of an
EMR, the survey was repeated. Comparison was made
between priorities identified by the whole practice
team as well as by physicians versus nursing versus
administrative staff. At the time of the repeat survey
the EMR was being used for scheduling and pre-
scribing of medication only. Paper charts were in use
for progress notes, labs, X-rays and other documents.
Physicians generally carried a laptop computer 
and the paper chart into the exam room for each
patient.
Setting
An academic rural primary care practice in western
New York State with 32 staff. Table 2 summarises the
characteristics of this practice.
Results
Table 3 shows the average score of the top five hazard-
ous items for each of the 12 different domains in the
practice (Figure 1). Some improvement in safety was
found only in the domains of physician–chart inter-
action, nurse–physician interaction and patient in the
planning phase. In the domains of nurse, nurse–chart
interaction, patient assessment, physician–patient
interaction in the assessment phase as well as
physician–patient interaction in the planning phase,
safety was adversely affected. This effect was very
significant in the first four. It is interesting to note that
the physician–patient interaction suffered more in the
assessment phase than in the planning phase. The
perturbation effects are illustrated in Figure 2. The
rest of the (four) domains do not appear to have been
affected.
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Table 1 Hazard matrix. Calculation of hazard: h=p×s
Severity (s) Probability (P)
Remote Uncommon Occasional Frequent
Minimal (=1%) 0.01 0.02 0.24 1
Mild (=5%) 0.03 0.10 1.20 5
Moderate (=20%) 0.10 0.40 4.80 20
Severe (=100%) 0.50 2 24 100
Table 2 Characteristics of the practice
Practice type Residency 
practice site
Visits per year 23 000
Physicians 6
Nursing staff 10
Administrative staff 16
Total practice staff 32
Respondents 30
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At baseline (T1), there was high concordance
between priorities identified by physicians, nursing
and administrative staff. After partial implementation
of the EMR, there was considerable decrease in this
concordance. Particularly noticeable is the drop from
four to no agreement on the ten top priority hazards
between physicians and nurses. The agreement pattern
is shown in detail in Table 4. In general the level of
agreement was halved.
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Table 3 Comparison of areas of practice in terms of the average of the top five hazard
items within each area: before and after partial implementation
Domain of practice T1: Before T2: After
Reception 16.31 16.50
Nurse 8.19 14.69
Nurse–patient interaction 9.45 9.53
Nurse–chart interaction 18.73 28.26
Patient: assessment 14.10 22.80
Physician: assessment 6.46 6.51
Physician–patient interaction: assessment 7.26 13.44
Physician–chart interaction 17.72 14.82
Nurse–physician interaction 9.92 6.99
Physician: plan 11.14 11.01
Physician–patient interaction: plan 4.92 7.12
Patient: plan 12.91 10.92
Figure 2 Influence of partial EMR implementation on the practice vulnerabilities
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Discussion and conclusions
This practice-based FMEA approach identified changes
in practice hazards apparently related to EMR imple-
mentation. This should help in targeting pre-existing
and new vulnerabilities in primary care practices.
It is important to note that the greatest adverse
effect due to partial implementation was in the
domains which already were perceived to be two of
the most hazardous, those of nurse–chart interaction
and patient at the assessment stage. This may have
been due in part to the transition that was under way,
during which time both paper and electronic charts
were being used. For example, medications docu-
mented in the paper chart are often inaccurate, lead-
ing to confusion. Greater vulnerability at the patient
assessment domain may be explained by the potential
for the physician’s interaction with the computer in
the examination room to interfere with his/her ability
to fully engage the patient during the interview. The
greatest reduction in vulnerabilities was in the
domains of the physician–chart interaction and patient
in the planning phase, followed by physician–nurse
interaction. These are thought to be reflections of
improved communication and reliability afforded by
the EMR. For example, physician–chart interaction
improved, perhaps due to greater reliance on the
electronic medication list.
It is in the nature of complex adaptive systems that
any intervention causes a perturbation that can stab-
ilise, preferably to a better safety state, only after a
certain period of time and then only under the
influences of the ‘central attractors’ described earlier.
In the absence of these attractors, instabilities and
‘devolution’ may result. The decrease in concordance
between perceptions of the subgroups may be inter-
preted as a symptom of this. This calls for caution
while introducing an intervention such as EMR,
especially in the transitory periods (starting from first
introduction to its complete implementation). Greater
attention needs to be paid to effective team-building
and training people (particularly in the new technol-
ogy) as members of their practice work teams. Failure to
do so can cause greater hazards to the patients and
ultimately the staff, leading to demoralisation and loss
of revenue.
Whilst adopting a strategy of introducing EMR (for
improving safety through effectiveness, efficiency and
timeliness, with accuracy, as well as for increasing
revenues) great effort has to be made to ensure that all
the components of this strategy are as transparent as
possible by making hazards visible so as to facilitate
recovery from them.
As stated earlier, the introduction of an EMR into
such a practice system represents a significant pertur-
bation that can have multiple unpredictable effects.
From a safety standpoint this can mean reduction in
some vulnerabilities and increase in others as well as
the introduction of new vulnerabilities that did not
exist under the old system. These effects need to be
monitored as reliably as possible.
The Perceived Hazard Questionnaire has the ability
to aid measurement of effects of the intervention.
Repeated use over time may provide an effective
means of identifying beneficial and detrimental
effects and can help to encourage a common shared
vision among team members and galvanise their
effort to adopt change for the better.
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